Inbox: - Scheffler: Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality and the Virtues - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-agent/ §1-5 - https://philpapers.org/rec/PORAVA - https://philpapers.org/rec/PETTCP-2 - https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVVAA - https://philpapers.org/rec/SMINAR-2 - https://philpapers.org/rec/PORCAA - [[Agent-relative theories are sometimes criticised as paradoxical]] - [[Agent-relative theories seem to be a better fit with everyday thought]] ## Philpapers primer https://philpapers.org/browse/agent-relative-value The distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral is a distinction in the form that various normative items (values, reasons, principles, theories) can take. Loosely speaking, agent-relative items make essential reference to the agent to whom they are addressed, e.g. the fact that x will make A happy is a reason for A to do x (or: the fact that x will make A's daughter happy is a reason for A to do x) while agent-neutral ones are generically addressed to anyone, e.g. the fact that x will make A happy is a reason (for anyone) to do x. The distinction is generally used to capture key differences between 1) deontological and consequentialist theories: the former make use of agent-relative principles or reasons, the latter do not; 2) ethical egoism and impartialism; 3) special obligations and impersonal ones. Arguing in favour of the agent-relative (or even against the agent-neutral) is therefore thought to be one central move in defending deontology, and mutatis mutandis for consequentialism. However, some authors have explored a broader understanding of consequentialism as teleology, which allows for agent-relativity. In most of the literature, agent-relative values are understood as constructions out of agent-relative reasons or principles, rather than an independent concept or entity. _Key works_ The distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral was first formally proposed, under the labels of subjective and objective reasons, in [Nagel 1970](https://philpapers.org/rec/NAGTPO-4). [Parfit 1984](https://philpapers.org/rec/PARRAP) draws a somewhat similar but different distinction, introducing the labels agent-relative and agent-neutral (theories). [Nagel 1986](https://philpapers.org/rec/NAGTVF) contains a classic statement of a complex normative outlook which includes both agent-relative and agent-neutral principles. [McNaughton & Rawling 1991](https://philpapers.org/rec/MCNAAT) and subsequent papers have done capital work to formulate the distinction and its implications. [Dreier 1993](https://philpapers.org/rec/DRESON) is a good starting point for exploring the possibility of agent-relative teleology. Essential historical references which allude to the distinction and its implications are: [Sidgwick 1871](https://philpapers.org/rec/SIDTMO-2), [Moore 1903](https://philpapers.org/rec/MOOPE), and [Broad 1942](https://philpapers.org/rec/BROCFI) (especially for the contrast between egoism and consequentialism/impartialism), and [Ross 1930](https://philpapers.org/rec/ROSTRA-3), for a classic statement of the importance of moral agent-relative reasons or duties. _Introductions_ [Ridge 2011](https://philpapers.org/rec/RIDRFA); [Portmore 2013](https://philpapers.org/rec/PORAVA); [Pettit 1997](https://philpapers.org/rec/PETTCP-2); [McNaughton & Rawling 1995](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVVAA); [Smith 2003](https://philpapers.org/rec/SMINAR-2); [Portmore 2001](https://philpapers.org/rec/PORCAA).  The last three papers contain both advanced introductory material and further developments of the themes described in the summary and key works. ## SEP: Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-agent/ ### Highlights from §6-7 If we can properly understand the reasons corresponding to deontological restrictions as agent-relative (and temporally relative) teleological reasons but teleological reasons all the same then in effect we can, as James Dreier puts it, ‘consequentialize’ deontology, surprisingly enough. The apparent success of deploying agent-relativity to ‘consequentialize’ deontology leads Dreier to defend the more bold hypothesis that _any_ moral theory can be represented as a form of consequentialism so long as we are willing to allow that consequentialism comes in agent-relative as well as agent-neutral versions. The central idea behind consequentialism, on this way of thinking, is its teleology and commitment to maximizing, both of which seem compatible with agent-relativity about that which is maximized.[[8](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-agent/notes.html#8)] If Dreier is right about this then the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction may be more important than the distinction between consequentialist theories and non-consequentialist theories. [...] Nor should we forget that the first real use of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction was Nagel’s in _The Possibility of Altruism_. There Nagel tried to prove that all reasons must be agent-neutral on pain of a kind of practical solipsism. Nagel eventually abandoned this argument in light of objections from Nicholas Sturgeon (see Sturgeon 1974), but the argument is ingenious and Nagel may have abandoned it prematurely. If any such argument could ever be made to work then we might be able to settle a wide range of difficult issues in normative philosophy without simply appealing to first-order intuitions about cases which so often seems to lead to philosophical stalemate. Moreover, if an argument like Nagel’s could be made to work then its implications would be dramatic. Not only egoistic reasons but arguably deontological reasons and reasons arising out of special relations to one’s nearest and dearest would stand refuted, as would what Nagel later referred to as ‘reasons of autonomy’ (see Nagel 1986: 165). Furthermore, Nagel is not the only one to have offered abstract considerations in favor of the thesis that all reasons are agent-neutral. For example, some of Derek Parfit’s work on personal identity is supposed to undermine the importance of personal identity as such, and that in turn might undermine the tenability of agent-relativity (see Parfit 1984). [...] Finally, the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction can also provide a useful lens through which to examine some of the arguments of historical figures. Sidgwick’s famous discussion of the ‘dualism of practical reason’ can now be seen as an instance of the more general tension between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. G.E. Moore’s argument against ethical egoism would, if sound, refute agent-relative conceptions more generally (see Moore 1903: 96–105), since Moore’s main objection is not to egoism in particular but (in effect) to agent-relative conceptions of the good more generally.