Inbox: - https://www.longtermresilience.org/post/how-the-uk-government-should-address-the-misuse-risk-from-ai-enabled-biological-tools - https://blueprintbiosecurity.org/ - https://www.decodingbio.com/p/decoding-biosecurity-and-biodefense - https://biobot.io/ - https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/28iXeSY75aLsqAagg/map-of-the-biosecurity-landscape-list-of-gcbr-relevant-orgs ## WIP on democratised biosynthesis But in the short term, the most concerning trend is proliferation in the capabilities of non-state actors. Thanks to the increasing ubiquity of DNA synthesis technology, the people in the world who could be capable of assembling an influenza virus based on publicly available genetic sequences [number in the tens of thousands](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Esvelt%20Testimony.pdf). In an act that might plausibly have caused more harm than good, researchers proved that they could reconstitute horsepox – an extinct virus similar to smallpox – [for a mere $100,000](https://www.science.org/content/article/how-canadian-researchers-reconstituted-extinct-poxvirus-100000-using-mail-order-dna). We cannot reasonably expect to reliably shape the intent of every single individual who might ever be capable of doing this work, especially as the bioeconomy grows. If it became possible for individuals to order highly enriched uranium online, I think we would all agree that this would constitute a threat to global security. We need to constrain the capability of non-state actors to do the biological equivalent. At present, providers of synthetic DNA are not legally required to screen for dangerous sequences, though [many do so voluntarily](https://genesynthesisconsortium.org/). A few organizations have risen to the challenge of ensuring synthesis providers [have access to effective screening](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00086/full). One, the [Nuclear Threat Initiative](https://www.nti.org/), a nonprofit whose focus is global nuclear and biosecurity, is in the process of launching the [International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS)](https://www.nti.org/about/programs-projects/project/international-biosafety-and-biosecurity-initiative-for-science-ibbis/), an organization whose mission includes [preventing the misuse of DNA synthesis technology](https://www.nti.org/about/programs-projects/project/preventing-the-misuse-of-dna-synthesis-technology/). Separately, the [Secure DNA Project](https://www.securedna.org/main-en) aims to provide companies all over the world with free, fast, and secure screening of synthetic DNA orders. We are fortunate that a small group of companies, nonprofits, altruistic scientists, and philanthropists are stepping in to help keep us safe. But while such efforts show promise, it remains to be seen whether they will successfully accelerate the universalization of synthesis screening. While we live in a time characterized with the [return](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA830-1.html) of [Great Power conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_War), we can [take inspiration from the past](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Arms_Limitation_Talks) that cooperation to reduce the threat of species-level catastrophe can and must take place even while we fight. WIP on gain of function research While the [evidence](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00584-8) [seems to](https://www.worksinprogress.co/an-inconvenient-sleuth/) [point](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abp8715) [away](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abp8337) from the theory that the source of the Covid-19 pandemic was the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), the idea that a pandemic could occur as a result of an accidental breach of a high-containment laboratory is scientifically credible. Lab leaks have [plenty of precedent](https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/08/24/infections-caught-in-laboratories-are-surprisingly-common), even from the [highest-grade “BSL-4” labs](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7088173/). For example, the [2007 foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_United_Kingdom_foot-and-mouth_outbreak) in the United Kingdom was the result of a [leaky waste pipe](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/250363/0312.pdf) at the joint site of a BSL-4 lab and a vaccine manufacturer. Even more worryingly, shortly after the vaccine site was relicensed for production, FMD virus leaked _again_ into the site drainage system. Fortunately it wasn’t released into the nearby environment, thanks to upgrades made to the drainage in response to the first leak, but it illustrates the challenges of maintaining biosecurity even when you are on heightened alert. And even if the origin of SARS-CoV-2 was not the WIV, we have probably already had the first pandemic in humans caused by escape from a lab. The 1977 [Russian flu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977_Russian_flu) pandemic is so genetically similar to ancestral H1N1 flu strains in the context of the normal mutation rate of influenza viruses that a lab sample is [the most plausible origin](https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/mBio.01013-15). WIP on UVC and PPC But there is also an emerging technology that could complement air filtration and potentially transform microbial suppression in the built environment. UVC light is a potent antimicrobial with a long history of specialized use, but its main limitation is that UVC lightwaves with a wavelength over 230 nanometers penetrate our skin through to the DNA in our cells and can cause cancer. However, UVC with a wavelength below 230 nanometers is readily absorbed by even a small layer of protein. The photons are therefore blocked from reaching and degrading our DNA by absorption in the outer layer of human skin that consists of dead cells. This shorter wavelength far-UVC [is still very effective against airborne microbes](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-67211-2) – or indeed any other nucleic acids that remain exposed to the far-UVC photons – and all studies so far show these wavelengths to be safe. We shouldn’t overhype new technologies, and there are many challenges to overcome and questions to answer. For example, we need to do more testing on the effect of far-UVC on the common materials, cosmetics, and surfaces it would come into contact with if deployed ubiquitously, and how its efficacy interacts with existing ventilation systems. While it has shown much promise against small virus particles suspended in the air (such as coronaviruses), how effective it will be for diseases spread by larger [respiratory droplets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Respiratory_droplet) requires further investigation. We need to do more safety studies to make sure that the sources of far-UVC we deploy don’t emit wavelengths over 230 nanometers as a by-product. Most studies have been done at a wavelength of 222 nanometers, and there may be trade-offs of different sub-230-nanometer wavelengths that we have yet to explore. And with an ambitious vision of ubiquitous deployment, we need to test realistic edge cases such as how safe it is if you have an open wound. There is a lot to do in order to bring far-UVC out of the lab and into our homes. But it is the most promising new candidate for building a pandemic firewall. More prosaically, we can also wear a firewall on our person. Personal protective equipment (PPE) can range from cheap reusable face masks of varying levels of comfort and effectiveness all the way to cumbersome full body suits for those in most danger of exposure to deadly pathogens. But current PPE is lacking in almost every dimension. It is uncomfortable, unattractive, impractical, insufficiently reusable, and imperfectly protective. We can and need to do better.