> In some, it is their weaknesses that philosophize; in others, their riches and strengths. The former need their philosophy, be it as a prop, a sedative, medicine, redemption, elevation, or self-alienation; for the latter, it is only a beautiful luxury, in the best case the voluptuousness of a triumphant gratitude that eventually has to inscribe itself in cosmic capital letters on the heaven of concepts. > > […] > > All those bold lunacies of metaphysics, especially answers to the question about the value of existence, may always be considered first of all as symptoms of certain bodies; and if such world affirmations or world negations lack altogether any grain of significance when measured scientifically, they give the historian and psychologist all the more valuable hints as symptoms. > <cite>Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Preface to the Second Edition</cite> > We take care not to say that the world is worth /less/ […] the whole attitude of man […] as judge of the world who finally places existence itself on his scales and finds it too light—the monstrous stupidity of this attitude has finally dawned on us and we are sick of it. > <cite>Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Book V, §346</cite> Axiology is the study of value and disvalue. Once you have an axiological theory, you can (in theory) use it to rank possible worlds from best to worst. In general, an axiology, plus an accurate picture of the world you find yourself in, can yield the following results: 1. Cheerful: Good to date; good future 2. Future optimism: Bad to date; good future 3. Future pessimism: Good to date; bad future 4. Total disaster: Bad to date; bad future I really want an orientation that yields result (1). I see this as a grounding commitment—it’s not something I think I (or others) should be persuaded out of. If an axiology does not generate the cheerful picture, I take that as nearly a sufficient reason to reject it. With Nietzsche, I think this commitment is best understood as an expression of who and what I am. To relax this constraint would be to become a different person, someone who is open to seeing existence as a curse. (In the past, I was such a person.) Nietzsche denies that there is a correct answer to the question “what is the true axiology?” out there in the world. As I read him, Nietzsche would say that the world, existence, just is—neutral, indifferent—and we must choose how we relate to it. Axiology is a form of self-expression, whether or not we solemnly imagine ourselves as an [[Ideal Observer]]. I tend to agree. What would be so bad about results (3) and (4)? Total disaster and future pessimism both imply (before you adjust for moral uncertainty) that we should turn off the lights now or soon [^1]. The horror of the problem of suffering makes this kind of view somewhat understandable. But… it’s so unattractive. And it's maladaptive: the future belongs to the life lovers. If I channel my inner [[David Pearce]], I can worry that “cheerful” breeds catastrophic complacency and conservatism, underplaying the horrors of our present condition, and the urgency of a transition to something better. I want a hybrid: the cheerfulness of cheerful, plus the urgency that comes from awareness of suffering and lost potential. Bostrom on Astronomical Waste and Letter from Utopia are reasonable attempts at this. And yes, Pearce on abolishing involuntary suffering is good too.