Putting consequentialism in its place. You don’t have to maximise. * Your best axiology. * OK, is that all I’m allowed to care about? * Well that’s too hard, I’ll give myself a pass due to my flawed nature * Opportunity cost * Infinite demands Pass two: * Try hard. But you don’t have to maximise. * What would you do when you discover the true moral theory? * Maximise considered harmful Insofar as spending time with a friend does not maximise the good, impartially considered, is it ultimately a matter of regret that I do it? Options for the consequentialist: 1. Yes, it is a matter of regret. 2. Yes, it is a matter of regret, but it is not morally wrong, because you could not do otherwise, due to your nature as a human being with all sorts of stubbornly partial attachments. 1. Corrolary: if we could update the software of the human mind to care more about the good impartially considered, that’d be a good thing. 3. No—although this particular action does not maximise the good, the dispositions that motivate it are goodness maximising on average, such that following those dispositions (rather than calculating consequences for each action) leads to the best consequences. All reasonable moral theories have some interest in consequences. The distinctive mark of consequentialism is the claim that only consequences matter [, and that we should maximise]. Susan Wolf thinks that a good life involves several grounding commitments, including an impartial concern for maximising the good. In consequentialist moral thought, there is a tendency for impartial concern to take over, to present itself as, ultimately, the only perspective that counts. Insofar as we honour general rules or personal commitments, the correctness of so doing is fundamentally a question of whether the good is maximised, impartially considered. Questions one might have: - What does good mean, from a fully impartial perspective? - Even if we cash out a notion of impartial good, why should a particular individual feel obliged to maximise it? Why not enjoy freedom to be as you are? - Radical conclusions - Why does this matter? Transhumanism and the future. The caravan. What do I actually think? * It’s fine to leave value on the table. (The maximising thing is the issue?) * Minimising disvalue seems more pressing... Although there is a tendency for this commitment to take over We should not think of it as our single most important commitment, to which all others are subordinate. Wolf characterises the “impartialist insight” as: @todo > the claim that all persons are equally deserving of well-being and respect. > Specifically, it concerns just how ready we should be to take up a detached perspective, to view our relations to others just as someone’s relations to others (and to think of the people we love just as some persons). It concerns the notion that there can be “one thought too many”. > One form of Extreme Impartialism is something that virtually all impartialists would reject: on this view, “a person is morally required to take each person’s well-being, or alternatively each person’s rights, as seriously as every other, to work equally hard to secure them, or to care equally much about them, or to grant them equal value in her practical deliberations.” 36That the view is absurd is evident from the fact that it entails, as she puts it, that “morality requires one to care, or to act as if one cares, no more about one’s own child than about a stranger’s.” So far I am in complete agreement with Wolf. But she deems “only slightly less absurd” the “much more popular view … that permits partisan emotions and behavior, as long as in fact they promote nonpartisan goals.” 37 > The acceptability of coaching one’s daughter’s soccer team, or taking one’s friend to dinner on her birthday does not rest on the fortuitous coincidence that this action, or even the way of life that gives rise to it, is the one that will maximize human welfare or equal respect all around.” Not, I agree, on the fortuitous coincidence, but if we replace “fortuitous coincidence” with “fact” is the view that she rejects absurd? Not being a consequentialist, I do not endorse the view; but it does not seem to me to be an “extreme” form of impartialism, or in any way absurd. 38I suspect that to those who find it absurd, the problem is that it runs afoul of the **“one thought too many” requirement, a requirement that I find elusive, but which seems to involve the notion that justification either should not be sought, or should not be sought from a distant, objective point of view. More on that shortly.** While this insight is an essential aspect of moral thought, integrating it into one’s life need not mean letting it absolutely take over. A more moderate integration might involve recognising that morality requires one to act only in ways that one thinks any reasonable person would allow. Such an interpretation leaves room for a good deal of (unapologetic) partiality in one’s grounding commitments. At this point, a consequentialist point to the difference between a decision procedure (the practical means for an individual to decide) and a criteria of rightness (the things that ultimately determine the moral value of the action). No consequentialist thinks that individuals should always think in terms of maximising the good every time they face a decision: they should instead think in whatever way leads to the best consequences. Most of the time this will mean relying on rules of thumb and intuitions that make no explicit reference to maximising the good impartially considered. A reform-minded impartialist might object that such a moderate formulation is a recipe for complacency and conservatism. Much will hang on how you define the class of “reasonable people” and what kinds of commitment you regard as essential to a person’s identity (c.f. [[Bernard Williams]]). My sense is that there is a way to relate to the impartialist insight which leaves plenty of scope for reformist agendas, while avoiding the implication that we may only spend time with our loved ones, or pursue personal delights, insofar as this is consistent with the pursuit of maximising the good, impartially considered. In practice, a “moderate” stance might mean that individually and collectively we knowingly leave some goods on the table in order to preserve a tradition, honour a promise, pursue knowledge, enjoy serenity, or to otherwise express our particular values, such as they are. Places to start: * [Moral Saints](https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026228) ([Aeon commentary by Daniel Callcut](https://aeon.co/essays/why-it-is-better-not-to-aim-at-being-morally-perfect)) * [Morality and Partiality](https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214247) * Book: The Variety of Values * Book: Meaning in Life (I’ve not read this yet, but I expect it’s good)